I think this is largely embarrassing. The author pesters us with an imputation on Hume as an analytically bankrupt political thinker but fails to deliver any concrete proof.
Then the author assumes (while incorrectly interpreting Hume) that their own politics are correct and any divergence proves that Hume is a failed political thinker.
We don’t find Hume’s criticism of Mandeville instead we find an interpretation of modern conservatism as an obviously evil caricature which can only be developed by the inability to understand a viewpoint which doesn’t immediately affirms one’s preconceived beliefs.
> The follies of a “first do no harm” approach are redoubled today, when the failure to grapple with inequality, and especially climate change, threatens the stability of the global order.
In one sentence, the idea of cautious changes is abandoned without a single argument, while it simultaneously argues for the kind of conservatism for which the author blames Hume.
That said, I totally do believe that a great philosopher is not a good statesman by definition. Our models, our theories, our thinking are not capable of encompassing the complexity of a single being, let alone a society. To change society's direction only the tiniest bit requires an entirely different skill set.
> The author pesters us with an imputation on Hume as an analytically bankrupt political thinker but fails to deliver any concrete proof.
"analytically bankrupt political thinker" - I didn't think the author implied something so strong.
"but fails to deliver any concrete proof" - Not sure what constitutes "proof" in conversation like this. But I think the author did show that Hume came close to understanding the many problems of his society- racism, divorce, wealth inequality- but his over-skepticism led him to dismiss any social change. The central point is that while Hume was skeptical of change, he wasn't equally skeptical of established order.
I'm not that big fan of this article either. But I think you're being unnecessarily harsh.
That’s a strange interpretation of Hume. Hume was a radical, he doubted causality itself. He only defends modern political institutions to the extent that they provide some utility in pursuance of “liberty, order and peace”. If they don’t he welcomed revolution.
For instance he disavowed the contemporary practice of British Mercantilism. In general, his radical political thought inspired America through Smith and thereby Payne.
Hume is against wealth inequality he’s just merely against perfect symmetry of possessions preventing barter and thereby preventing cooperation—-as stated in Political Discourses.
His views on marriage are cherry-picked, he’s pro-divorce. Again, his point is simply that in a marriage with children, one can expect the original passion to have been loss, so that passion alone cannot sustain a marriage. However if that marriage bears children, for the sake of the children, he recommends to abstain from the divorce for the development of the children.
> an analytically bankrupt political thinker but fails to deliver any concrete proof.
Huh?
I've always encountered Hume's politics in the same manner as e.g. Heidegger's; the only real question is whether you can divorce the thinker from his politics. Genuinely, I thought this was a fairly common experience of being introduced to Hume.
Like, was Heidegger a Nazi? Shrug, I guess we can have an academic conversation about that... but in any case we all agree his politics don't exactly help make the case for his philosophy. So with Hume; the introductory conversations are quite similar.
Could you provide a robust defense for Hume's politics? I think the standard consensus is that he was... well, wrong, at least about chattel slavery, and putting it quite mildly.
> I think the standard consensus is that he was... well, wrong, at least about chattel slavery, and putting it quite mildly.
Is the standard consensus suddenly pro-slavery?
> As much as submission to a petty prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; so much is domestic slavery more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever. The more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the less are our actions inspected and controled; and the fainter that cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another. The remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN colonies, and among some EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a desire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity, commonly observed in persons, accustomed, from their infancy, to exercise so great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were sufficient alone to disgust us with that unbounded dominion. Nor can a more probable reason be assigned for the severe, I might say, barbarous manners of ancient times, than the practice of domestic slavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low debasement of his slaves.
Nowadays it's just assumed that any racist must be an advocate for slavery, or gas chambers, or whatever. Actually reading racists (like Hume) would quickly disabuse one of that notion.
>> I think the standard consensus is that he was... well, wrong, at least about chattel slavery, and putting it quite mildly.
> Is the standard consensus suddenly pro-slavery?
The standard consensus is that slavery is wrong because the people being enslaved were equal in their humanity to those enslaving them. This isn't abstract thing... equal treatment under the law is, for example, encoded by constitutional amendments in the united states.
Hume had a decidedly different view on the rationale for ending slavery. He was a philosopher, not merely an elector, so the actual reasons do in fact matter when studying him and his ideas.
Do you really believe that the standard consensus on slavery doesn't also include a rejection of racism or an affirmation of equal protection under the law? Come on. Hume was wrong. He knew that 3+3=6 because 3x3=6 and 2+2=4 and 2x2=4. He was wrong, and countering that all is fine here because 3+3=6 after all is stupid.
> Nowadays it's just assumed that any racist must be an advocate for slavery, or gas chambers, or whatever. Actually reading racists (like Hume) would quickly disabuse one of that notion.
And where do I make that assumption? As GP would say, what an embarrassing reading of both the essay and my comment ;-)
Hume's opinions on chattel slavery were profoundly wrong. He's an interesting case because he was wrong in a very particular and peculiar way. Again, the comparison to Heidegger is apt. Obviously, that subtlety -- wrong, but in a weird way -- is the jumping-off point for this article.
Again, do you care to actually defend Hume's politics?
I guess I'd have to disagree that anyone who's position on chattel slavery is 'anti' is wrong about chattel slavery. It's honestly kind of a nitpick, but if I didn't read the essay I wouldn't have thought that by saying he was wrong about it you meant he was against it, but in the wrong way.
Of course, this could all be one of those weird linguistic quirks. There really isn't any way I could think of to provide evidence I'm even right in this.
It's worth noting, when reading the great philosophers of that era and earlier, how static their world was. When Hume was writing, steam engines barely worked and the American Revolution hadn't happened yet. GDP growth was a few percent per century. Most people did not see the world change much in their lifetime.
Actually, I would say 18th century was definitely quite happening. Yes, we did not see much GDP growth. However, this was a century where tides shifted. While the Mughal empire and Qing Dynasty accounting for probably 55% of the world's GDP at the start of the century by the end of the century we see Europe dominating the whole world (the Mughal Empire was taken over by the British and the seeds of the opium war were being sown by the end of the century). The 18th century is also probably the first time when we see the entire world as a single unit. Thanks to advances in sailing, European traders were all over the place. In the 1750s we see what is probably the first world scale conflict with the Seven Year War. For the first time in human History politics in one continent affects the politics of another continent. The fact is the world was changing faster than ever before in the 18th century. I'm pretty sure its hard not to feel the winds of change if you were alive at the time.
It would look dynamic to an omnipotent being, but I think your parent comment was referring to the experience of an average human. Pretty much everyone on the planet at that time died living much the same life as their parents and grandparents.
I would say thats qiite a eurocentric view. Many Asians would have been plunged into poverty. Entire industries essentially disappeared with the coming of the British (muslin, wootz steel) and new industries would be formed (opium, indigo). They would also have faced a a vastly different set of rules.
My impression is that the point would apply to those countries as well. The vast majority of people, even in those countries, lived just as their parents and grandparents.
Interesting point. If deciding whether to advocate for change or not, and you don't see much evidence that change actually happens (and/or works), that would certianly bias someone toward conservatism.
Or you could derive the exact opposite conclusion, advocating for change since it hardly ever happens so we would like to have more of it.
Anyway, the arguments today are not necessarily about change but rather about what kind of change. Which I suspect was always the case, conservatism or progressivism are just team names, exactly like democrats and republicans. In Australia the liberals are the right wing party, it is just a label.
The reaction of given period’s academic culture to Hume speaks as much about the culture as it does about Hume. We now have an academic culture with very strong social beliefs, minimally tolerant of those that don’t toe the line, and justifiably so in many ways. It may be many decades before the standards by which academics judge historical thinkers starts to soften, if ever. Because Kant and Hume may be left somewhat by the wayside for a while, there’s a grand opportunity for their replacements. I would pitch to a publisher that the old canon is appallingly ripe for disruption.
On the other hand, I think this rampant ahistoricity is problematic. We currently have a notion of tolerance which does not extend past the present, if we don’t manage to engage with historical thought in a principled way, acknowledging the faults of our predecessors while retaining their virtues, I fear we’ll lose more than we’ll gain. Ironically, Descartes was responsible for such an ignorant, damaging ahistorical program, effectively jettisoning a whole swath of philosophical work that went on after Ockham and effectively launching a virus of egoism that’s still rampant, virulent, and probably at the worst its ever been in modern western thought.
Descartes did the opposite of launching a "virus of egoism that's still rampant".
Max stirner is the philosopher who tried and failed to launch a "virus of egoism". Stirner is not fond of descartes or the cogito and stirners entire philosophical project is a defense of egoism
Yes, I’d think the formal fetishists of analytic philosophy are a symptom for sure (some of the projects of Russell, Frege, etc.), but I’m referring to a more general tendency after Descartes (of which Humean skepticism might be interpreted as an example) to take the cogito quite far, insofar as one falls into solipsism, forgetting that being and knowledge need objective grounds and are highly dependent on interaction with the so called “other” (a radical Descartean position would argue that the mind is able to “know” purely of its own accord and deemphasize the communicative and collaborative aspects of knowledge creation (an ahistoricity)). If you examine anglo-saxon philosophical practice post-Descartes you’ll find solipsistic tendencies are more then rule than the exception. (Continental philosophy is more exempt from this tendency, but also has instances of this)
Misguided articles like this are the consequence of deifying “Progress.” Today is treated as necessarily better than yesterday. Whether this is actually historically true, or examining what “better” is supposed to mean, are never investigated.
It’s especially ironic when modern people look at past eras and think, “How could they ever have thought they were justified in doing what they did? How could they have assumed they were superior and on the right side of history?” Well, people are doing the same thing today. So it’s not particularly surprising.
This has its roots in Christianity and this is made clear when you compare Western linear concepts of time to say, Hindu cyclical ones. Which is, of course deeply ironic considering the ideologies involved here. It’s an odd sort of subconscious Christian ouroboros.
Excessive focus on the past as better then the present leads only to stagnation. You wind up with policy-making that is just a cargo-cult of what history books and half-remembered stories say, rather then dealing with reality.
Is it overly focusing on the past or is it discounting the past because the present has to be better, while in reality we are making the same mistakes.
The periodicity is there, but we ignore it because we assume we are necessarily improving regardless because of our falsely assumed temporal-progress trajectory.
You see this in system design where someone makes something new, as a goal of improving an existing system, but really the only quality it has is that it is new. So they are also constructing a future shitty system at the same time. In many instances, one should ignore time and think about states. Or at least heavily discount it and don't let it distort your thinking.
It seems odd to judge the correctness of a historic philosopher by whether he conforms to current fads rather than any objective wrongness. Though I guess it's not really possible to judge any philosophical thing "objectively", so all we have to go on is the fads...
Assuming you think we are better off today than 1000 years ago, it seems that calibrating to perfect conservatism is not the right approach. At the same time, that's not a blank check to unleash whatever fasionable idea on hundreds of millions of people, as that has gone horribly wrong as well.
"The past ideas were wrong, and the present ideas (people like me have) are right. Hume had opinions like us in some ways, and thus was right about those, and shared the opinions of his own era in others, and thus was wrong about those others"
If Hume isn't a great philosopher, then it's because the category isn't coherent. Any reasonable understanding of great philosopher would include him. In terms of importance, scope, originality, argumentation, he's among the greats.
If skepticism isn't admirable, I'll have to ask you to behave in a less disreputable manner.
if it's tautological then there's no reason to attack it. It's merely uninteresting. If people still think they don't like it than the critique would have to something else.
Gödel showed that everything is tautological if you go low enough, but invoking it against yourself feels like an automatic point for the other side.
I am not invoking it, of course it is uninteresting. In a sport amongst friends with good intent it should be a suggestion to stay within bounds and satisfy the spirit of the game.
The problem of induction remains an outstanding problem. Extraordinary claims do require extraordinary proof. And moral realism remains contentious. There's justification for at least some of Hume's skepticism.
"Great philosophy" is an oxymoron. Philosophy has been and always will be nothing but mental masturbation. 98% of philosophical arguments are vapid debates about mere definitions of words. The entire discipline is completely unwilling to ever reject an idea, no matter how insane or nonsensical. Every philosophical question is answered with "well, Plato said this, and Hume said that, and Kant said this, and Descartes said this, and ...". If a philosopher ever accidentally makes a falsifiable claim, a testable prediction, or backs up his arguments with real evidence, he suddenly becomes a "philosopher and scientist". It's as if the term "philosophy" exists solely to describe thinking which is utterly useless.
This particular disconnect of philosophical liberalism and empiricism that was in many ways revolutionary and empowering for individuals standing in conflict with a repressive, traditionalist and elite culture is nothing new. It's particularly common in the British (and today American, having supplanted the British) elite not only during the time of Hume.
You also see it in Keynes for example, who on the one hand is a liberal hero but on the other was a fairly staunch imperialist and eugenicist. There's also Hayek, with his focus on freedom on the one hand but endorsement of monarchy or even dictatorship on the other.
Personally I think this is an inevitable consequence of liberalism in general (using the word in the broad, European sense of the term) because it's fundamentally an elite, top-down driven project. A belief system based on abstract, contractual and individual freedom made by and to a large degree for the governing and intellectual class is always going to come into tension with the population at large, leading to a Conservative political mentality, both on what we today call the left or the right.
Then the author assumes (while incorrectly interpreting Hume) that their own politics are correct and any divergence proves that Hume is a failed political thinker.
We don’t find Hume’s criticism of Mandeville instead we find an interpretation of modern conservatism as an obviously evil caricature which can only be developed by the inability to understand a viewpoint which doesn’t immediately affirms one’s preconceived beliefs.
> The follies of a “first do no harm” approach are redoubled today, when the failure to grapple with inequality, and especially climate change, threatens the stability of the global order.
In one sentence, the idea of cautious changes is abandoned without a single argument, while it simultaneously argues for the kind of conservatism for which the author blames Hume.
That said, I totally do believe that a great philosopher is not a good statesman by definition. Our models, our theories, our thinking are not capable of encompassing the complexity of a single being, let alone a society. To change society's direction only the tiniest bit requires an entirely different skill set.
The writing is of a quality that suggests the thinking behind it is very poor.
Something like: A is bad. B is bad. Not A does not decrease B. Therefore, not A is bad.
"analytically bankrupt political thinker" - I didn't think the author implied something so strong.
"but fails to deliver any concrete proof" - Not sure what constitutes "proof" in conversation like this. But I think the author did show that Hume came close to understanding the many problems of his society- racism, divorce, wealth inequality- but his over-skepticism led him to dismiss any social change. The central point is that while Hume was skeptical of change, he wasn't equally skeptical of established order.
I'm not that big fan of this article either. But I think you're being unnecessarily harsh.
For instance he disavowed the contemporary practice of British Mercantilism. In general, his radical political thought inspired America through Smith and thereby Payne.
Hume is against wealth inequality he’s just merely against perfect symmetry of possessions preventing barter and thereby preventing cooperation—-as stated in Political Discourses.
His views on marriage are cherry-picked, he’s pro-divorce. Again, his point is simply that in a marriage with children, one can expect the original passion to have been loss, so that passion alone cannot sustain a marriage. However if that marriage bears children, for the sake of the children, he recommends to abstain from the divorce for the development of the children.
A: And so one of the best developed ways to choose is lying and to short and badmouth motives, you are exposed to?
Hint: Other consumers who considered this did... 'There is no reason to wait, not now, there must be a way to choose!'
(-;
Huh?
I've always encountered Hume's politics in the same manner as e.g. Heidegger's; the only real question is whether you can divorce the thinker from his politics. Genuinely, I thought this was a fairly common experience of being introduced to Hume.
Like, was Heidegger a Nazi? Shrug, I guess we can have an academic conversation about that... but in any case we all agree his politics don't exactly help make the case for his philosophy. So with Hume; the introductory conversations are quite similar.
Could you provide a robust defense for Hume's politics? I think the standard consensus is that he was... well, wrong, at least about chattel slavery, and putting it quite mildly.
Is the standard consensus suddenly pro-slavery?
> As much as submission to a petty prince, whose dominions extend not beyond a single city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; so much is domestic slavery more cruel and oppressive than any civil subjection whatsoever. The more the master is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; the less are our actions inspected and controled; and the fainter that cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the freedom, and even dominion of another. The remains which are found of domestic slavery, in the AMERICAN colonies, and among some EUROPEAN nations, would never surely create a desire of rendering it more universal. The little humanity, commonly observed in persons, accustomed, from their infancy, to exercise so great authority over their fellow-creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were sufficient alone to disgust us with that unbounded dominion. Nor can a more probable reason be assigned for the severe, I might say, barbarous manners of ancient times, than the practice of domestic slavery; by which every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low debasement of his slaves.
Nowadays it's just assumed that any racist must be an advocate for slavery, or gas chambers, or whatever. Actually reading racists (like Hume) would quickly disabuse one of that notion.
> Is the standard consensus suddenly pro-slavery?
The standard consensus is that slavery is wrong because the people being enslaved were equal in their humanity to those enslaving them. This isn't abstract thing... equal treatment under the law is, for example, encoded by constitutional amendments in the united states.
Hume had a decidedly different view on the rationale for ending slavery. He was a philosopher, not merely an elector, so the actual reasons do in fact matter when studying him and his ideas.
Do you really believe that the standard consensus on slavery doesn't also include a rejection of racism or an affirmation of equal protection under the law? Come on. Hume was wrong. He knew that 3+3=6 because 3x3=6 and 2+2=4 and 2x2=4. He was wrong, and countering that all is fine here because 3+3=6 after all is stupid.
> Nowadays it's just assumed that any racist must be an advocate for slavery, or gas chambers, or whatever. Actually reading racists (like Hume) would quickly disabuse one of that notion.
And where do I make that assumption? As GP would say, what an embarrassing reading of both the essay and my comment ;-)
Hume's opinions on chattel slavery were profoundly wrong. He's an interesting case because he was wrong in a very particular and peculiar way. Again, the comparison to Heidegger is apt. Obviously, that subtlety -- wrong, but in a weird way -- is the jumping-off point for this article.
Again, do you care to actually defend Hume's politics?
Of course, this could all be one of those weird linguistic quirks. There really isn't any way I could think of to provide evidence I'm even right in this.
Most people did not see the world change much in their lifetime.
Anyway, the arguments today are not necessarily about change but rather about what kind of change. Which I suspect was always the case, conservatism or progressivism are just team names, exactly like democrats and republicans. In Australia the liberals are the right wing party, it is just a label.
Max stirner is the philosopher who tried and failed to launch a "virus of egoism". Stirner is not fond of descartes or the cogito and stirners entire philosophical project is a defense of egoism
Indian, Chinese, Japanese is fascinating, and reading them can be eye opening too
It’s especially ironic when modern people look at past eras and think, “How could they ever have thought they were justified in doing what they did? How could they have assumed they were superior and on the right side of history?” Well, people are doing the same thing today. So it’s not particularly surprising.
This has its roots in Christianity and this is made clear when you compare Western linear concepts of time to say, Hindu cyclical ones. Which is, of course deeply ironic considering the ideologies involved here. It’s an odd sort of subconscious Christian ouroboros.
The periodicity is there, but we ignore it because we assume we are necessarily improving regardless because of our falsely assumed temporal-progress trajectory.
You see this in system design where someone makes something new, as a goal of improving an existing system, but really the only quality it has is that it is new. So they are also constructing a future shitty system at the same time. In many instances, one should ignore time and think about states. Or at least heavily discount it and don't let it distort your thinking.
Assuming you think we are better off today than 1000 years ago, it seems that calibrating to perfect conservatism is not the right approach. At the same time, that's not a blank check to unleash whatever fasionable idea on hundreds of millions of people, as that has gone horribly wrong as well.
"The past ideas were wrong, and the present ideas (people like me have) are right. Hume had opinions like us in some ways, and thus was right about those, and shared the opinions of his own era in others, and thus was wrong about those others"
There is a lot of wisdom in this sentence. When attempting a reasoned debate, it is incredibly useful to assess assumptions and skepticism.
I often see a blind spot in reasoning when people assume that others are not skeptical about some domain.
Philosophy is seeking logically consistent truth.
The need for compromise is antithetical to philosophy’s goal.
It is nice and useful to bat around ideas but when one has to work in the world, things get dirty. Decisions get hard. Mistakes get made.
How useful can that be…
https://youtu.be/IgR6uaVqWsQ
If skepticism isn't admirable, I'll have to ask you to behave in a less disreputable manner.
I am not invoking it, of course it is uninteresting. In a sport amongst friends with good intent it should be a suggestion to stay within bounds and satisfy the spirit of the game.
You also see it in Keynes for example, who on the one hand is a liberal hero but on the other was a fairly staunch imperialist and eugenicist. There's also Hayek, with his focus on freedom on the one hand but endorsement of monarchy or even dictatorship on the other.
Personally I think this is an inevitable consequence of liberalism in general (using the word in the broad, European sense of the term) because it's fundamentally an elite, top-down driven project. A belief system based on abstract, contractual and individual freedom made by and to a large degree for the governing and intellectual class is always going to come into tension with the population at large, leading to a Conservative political mentality, both on what we today call the left or the right.